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This is the second in a planned series of reports on the concluding years 
of The Atlantic Philanthropies, the largest endowed institution ever to 
decide to put all its charitable assets to use in a fixed period of time and 
then close its doors. The pages that follow cover events from late 2009 
to early 2011, some five to six years before Atlantic expects to make its 
last grant commitments.
In the late months of 2011, the Foundation underwent a significant 
leadership transition, which brought both a new chair and a new CEO, 
along with other consequences that are still unfolding as this goes 
to print. For the most part, those changes were not contemplated at 
the time events in this report took place, and therefore do not play a 
role in the story it tells. Instead, this report seeks to give an account 
of Foundation activity as it was understood at the time, from the 
perspectives of people then leading the institution. To avoid confusion, 
when referring to people who later left Atlantic, the report will make 
clear that they are being referred to by the titles they held in 2010. 
It is likely that some of the trends, decisions, and assumptions described 
in this report will be modified by the time another year has passed. The 
next report in this series will have the responsibility of resuming the 
story and thereby tracking and explaining those changes.
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PHILANTHROPY ON A
SHRINKING CALENDAR
Early in 2011, Atlantic founder Charles F. Feeney became the 59th 
signatory to the Giving Pledge, an invitation to the wealthiest 
Americans to donate most of their wealth to philanthropy. In most 
respects, Mr. Feeney’s subscription was purely symbolic. Decades 
before Pledge founders Bill Gates and Warren Buffet issued their 
invitation, Mr. Feeney had already donated virtually all of his personal 
wealth, irrevocably, to the foundation he created, which eventually 
became known as The Atlantic Philanthropies. Still, his endorse-
ment was critically important for at least two reasons. First, Chuck 
Feeney was arguably the embodiment of the Giving Pledge idea: by 
surrendering all but a tiny fraction of his net worth in 1982 (a gift of 
cash, securities, and enterprises that would eventually be valued in 
the billions of dollars), he had set a standard of generosity probably 
unequaled in modern philanthropy. 
Second, his enormous financial sacrifice was followed, some years later, 
by a further commitment: to see all of his donation put to charitable use 
within his lifetime. This commitment to what he came to call Giving 
While Living had the effect of taking the principles of the Giving 
Pledge to a deeper level. It encouraged people of wealth not only to 
part with a significant percentage of their assets, but to take a personal 
and immediate role in the philanthropy that their donations made pos-
sible. “I cannot think of a more personally rewarding and appropriate 
use of wealth,” Mr. Feeney wrote to Bill Gates on February 22, 2011, 
“than to give while one is living — to personally devote oneself to 
meaningful efforts to improve the human condition. More importantly, 
today’s needs are so great and varied that intelligent philanthropic sup-
port and positive interventions can have greater value and impact today 
than if they are delayed.”
Beyond the effect that Mr. Feeney’s challenge would have on the rest of 
the charitable world, it would also have a more immediate, existential 
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effect on the foundation he created. At Mr. Feeney’s urging, the Board 
of The Atlantic Philanthropies voted in 2001 to begin disbursing all of 
the institution’s remaining assets and go out of business by the end of 
2020, when Chuck Feeney would be nearing his 90th birthday. To reach 
that goal, Atlantic’s final multiyear grant commitments would have to 
be made in 2016.
As a result of that decision, by the time Mr. Feeney added his name to 
the Giving Pledge roster, the Board of his Foundation, its Investment 
Committee, and its executive and financial officers had already devoted 
nearly a decade of planning to ensuring that the investment portfolio 
would provide a reasonably steady flow of grant and operating funds 
over the institution’s remaining years. By 2008, these plans were robust 
enough that even the market cataclysm of late 2007 would shrink 
the projected annual outlays only somewhat, without fundamentally 
disrupting the orderly winding down of the endowment. Trustees 
and senior managers had also taken steps to ensure that employees 
would remain enthusiastic and committed to their jobs, confident 
that the Foundation would work with them to prepare for a future 
beyond Atlantic. And the staff had set out on a thorough review of the 
Foundation’s program strategies, the last of which would be completed 
and approved by the Board at the end of 2009. 
What they had not yet done, according to a memo that Atlantic’s then-
CEO Gara LaMarche circulated to the Board in 2008, was formulate “a 
plan for leaving the fields and countries in which we work in a manner 
that protects and sustains the investments we have made.” Each of 
the four program strategies then under development did grapple with 
this challenge, at least to some degree. And all of them were being 
written with an eight-to-ten-year horizon in mind. Virtually all of them 
envisioned creating some solid body of work, or setting in motion 
some well-fueled campaign or process, that would outlive The Atlantic 
Philanthropies and make a lasting difference in their respective fields. 
The enduring achievements implicit in these plans included 
•	 helping	to	create	new	laws	and	sturdy	organizations	and	move-
ments to promote human rights in the United States, the 
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and South Africa; 
•	 mobilizing	networks	of	organizations	to	promote	active	and	
healthy aging in the United States, Ireland, and Northern 
Ireland; 
•	 compiling	rigorous,	authoritative	evidence	on	the	best	ways	to	
serve young children and their families in the Republic of Ireland; 
•	 contributing	to	a	larger	and	better-trained	nursing	workforce	in	
South Africa; 
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•	 helping	to	build	modern	systems	of	health	care,	research,	and	
public health in Viet Nam; 
and several other ambitious goals touching large populations and 
national systems. 
Yet the strategies then being written devoted nearly all their atten-
tion to ensuring that these efforts would be smart, well-executed, and 
effective. Although they expressly concentrated on goals that could be 
accomplished in the Foundation’s remaining lifetime, and many of them 
described the kind of legacy that might result, almost none of the plans 
specifically envisioned how the various efforts would end — what the 
final grants would be for, how grantees would survive the disappearance 
of such a large funder, how unfinished work might be carried on, and 
which activities would simply be impossible or unnecessary to sustain 
once Atlantic had closed its doors. 
To be sure, not all these questions could be answered conclusively eight 
to ten years in advance. But by the time of Mr. LaMarche’s 2008 memo, 
many staff members, and more and more grantees, were starting to con-
jure their own theories about what the end-stages of the various grant 
programs would probably look like. Several were asking — in increas-
ingly urgent terms — for at least some working hypotheses and broad 
guidelines to help them think about their options for terminal grants. 
Would there, for example, be a wave of endowments at the end? Might 
some of the Atlantic programs be transferred to other institutions and 
continue operating? Might there still be time and money left to pur-
sue some new areas of work? Would some offices or programs have an 
earlier closing date than the rest of the institution? Should some lines 
of work with the weakest prognosis be wound down soon, to free up 
resources for stronger ones? No program strategy made specific provi-
sion for (or against) any of these ideas, and nearly all were written as if 
they would continue in full effect until — as one senior officer jokingly 
put it — New Year’s Eve 2020, at around 11:59 p.m. (Another employee 
in the room, seizing on a loophole, added: “Viet Nam Time.”)
The jokes concealed more than a kernel of seriousness. As more and 
more employees were pointing out toward the end of 2008, it can take 
several years to wind down a line of grantmaking in a constructive way 
— and especially in a way that makes a lasting impact. To complicate 
matters further, many grantees, especially outside the United States, 
were vitally dependent on Atlantic funding and could not be weaned 
from that support easily or quickly. At the end of 2008, two senior offi-
cers, General Counsel David Sternlieb and then-Financial Controller 
David Walsh, reported that 36 percent of the Foundation’s grantees 
were substantially dependent on Atlantic grants, defining “dependency” 
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1. David Sternlieb and David Walsh, “Spend-Down: The Sustainability Challenge,” unpublished 
memorandum, Nov. 11, 2008. In the Sternlieb-Walsh analysis, a grantee is deemed “dependent” if 
it receives regular program support from Atlantic in an amount greater than one-third of its annual 
expenditures. The analysis did not include one-time support (such as for an evaluation or an exit 
grant), special-purpose grants outside the program themes, or funds intended for re-granting.
2. Tony Proscio, “Winding Down the Atlantic Philanthropies — The First Eight Years: 2001–
2009,” Center for Strategic Philanthropy and Civil Society, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke 
University, July 2010, p. 57, available at http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/content/winding-down-
atlantic-philanthropies-first-eight-years-2001-2009-tony-proscio.
as cases in which a grantee derives one-third or more of its annual bud-
get from Atlantic. In some countries, they found, the dependency ratio 
was much higher: “roughly 50 percent in Bermuda, Northern Ireland, 
and South Africa, and 60 percent in the Republic [of Ireland].”1 It 
would take years to help these grantees replace that amount of support 
— or, as seemed likely in many cases, to help them shrink in proportion 
to the lost income. Mr. LaMarche agreed: “We won’t have a meaningful 
legacy, much less the kind we might wish for ourselves,” he had written 
to the Board, “if we don’t think about this now — if we don’t imagine 
the end of Atlantic, and work back from there.”
Just over one year later, near the end of 2009, the Foundation received 
a report summarizing the steps it had taken thus far in the process of 
planning its final years, beginning with the Trustees’ decision in 2001 
to complete their work within the next two decades. The report, the 
first in a series, ended with a description of the unfolding process of 
imagination and planning that Mr. LaMarche called for in his memo, 
and concluded with a senior manager’s prediction that Atlantic would 
“have, in the next year or so, a plan for how the [programme] work will 
proceed, how it will narrow toward the later years, and how the work, 
the goals of our work, will drive all the other organizational functions 
toward that end…. [F]rom here on, the focus is going to be on the 
work, how we want it to end, what we want it to accomplish, and then 
plan around how we get there with all the resources and activities of the 
Foundation pulling together.”2
This report, the second in the series, takes up the story around the time 
that prediction was made, in late 2009. Unlike the previous report, 
which devoted roughly equal attention to financial management, 
human resources, and program planning, this installment concentrates 
primarily on program, for four reasons. First, events in the financial 
markets in 2009 and 2010 did not materially change the way Atlantic’s 
assets were being wound down, nor were there significant new 
expectations or demands on financial resources during the year that 
would lead to any substantial change in course. Second, although 
there were important developments in Atlantic’s Human Resources 
department, including the selection of a new director at the end of 
the year and the articulation of fundamental H.R. principles, the main 
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consequences of these developments would not become apparent until 
2011 and beyond. Among other things, the intention to create Personal 
Development Plans for each employee, to deal with their needs and 
goals in preparing for life after Atlantic, would not get under way 
until some time in 2011. Third, the most significant single change in 
Atlantic’s operation in 2010 was a reorganization of its program. By 
year’s end, most frontline programmatic decisions were set to be made 
country-by-country, rather than under broad, international themes 
like Aging or Human Rights. Key procedures for recommending and 
reviewing grants were also overhauled during 2010. Although these 
changes were not made solely because of Atlantic’s limited life, that 
was one important motivation for them. And they will have profound 
consequences for the way the Foundation envisions, plans for, and 
manages the activity that will bring its mission to a close. 
The fourth and most important reason for focusing this report pri-
marily on program matters is the one emphasized by the senior 
manager who was quoted earlier: the Foundation is determined to let 
the program strategies — “the goals of our work” — determine how 
“all the other organizational functions” draw to a close. Program will 
dictate what the other organizational divisions will need to do, not the 
other way around. As another employee put it, “the way we handle 
the [Foundation’s] real estate and other assets, the way we resolve a lot 
of legal issues, the way we think about personnel needs, contracting, 
all the business of running the foundation until the lights go out — 
all that stuff has got to be organized around making the most of our 
grant programs. Once we know what we want to accomplish in, say, 
South Africa, by when, with what resources, that will be the time to 
decide what to do with the South Africa office space, the South Africa 
evaluations and other contracts, the transition plans for staff in South 
Africa, and on and on.”
This report therefore follows the same logic. It concentrates on an exami-
nation of late-term program planning from two perspectives: first, the 
institution-wide effort to “imagine the end of Atlantic” and to launch an 
orderly process of translating that vision into concrete plans; and then a 
closer look at two particular programs, Population Health and Children 
and Youth, to understand the challenges and opportunities they face as 
they envision their final stages of grantmaking. (Future reports in this 
series will take a similar close look at the remaining three programs: 
Ageing, Reconciliation and Human Rights, and the Founding Chairman’s 
Grants) Two shorter sections will then conclude this report, summarizing 
the year’s events in financial management and human resources.
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1.
PRINCIPLE
FORMING AN INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO WINDING DOWN
In late 2009, Atlantic’s senior leadership began tackling what one execu-
tive described as “a series of decisions that we are going to have to make 
… in order to have the greatest impact in our remaining years.” One 
major decision in that series, after updated program strategies were 
approved at the end of 2009, was going to be how the remaining flow of 
grants would be analyzed, reviewed, and presented to the Board. As the 
Foundation approached its terminal phase of grantmaking, senior man-
agers at the time reasoned that program reviews would need to focus 
more and more keenly on endgame decision-making: How would each 
proposed grant contribute to the ultimate achievements envisioned in 
the strategies? How would each of them prepare grantees for the end of 
Atlantic funding? How would they affect the odds that unfinished work 
would continue after Atlantic’s exit? The formal grant review process 
as of 2009, many felt, was not only less than ideal for answering these 
questions, but had generally become, in words used by various officers, 
“mechanical,” “blinkered,” and “oppressive.” The template for writ-
ten grant recommendations was long and, many thought, belabored; 
the review procedure struck many as stifling and bureaucratic, and the 
results rarely produced the kind of “strategic, long-range discussion 
about impact and sustainability that we’re going to need from here on 
out,” as one senior executive put it. 
A program staff member involved in reforming the process pointed 
out that an overhaul would have become necessary even if the 
Foundation were planning to operate in perpetuity: “The whole thing 
had just become overgrown; it just kept building up and building up 
over the years. Every time there was a perceived problem anywhere 
in the process, we’d add a new step to avoid that particular problem. 
And then another issue would turn up, and we’d add something else to 
deal with that. Eventually it got to be practically interminable. You’d 
just finish one Board meeting and you’d have to start working on 
the write-ups and the whole rigmarole for the next one.” For several 
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years, the target of much of the staff’s frustration was a Programme 
Investment Committee, or PIC, whose preliminary review of grants 
was considered especially daunting. A working group had been formed 
in mid-decade to design a “PIC-less process” for reviewing and rec-
ommending grants, but by 2009, many officers were coming to believe 
that the problem lay deeper.
“PIC itself was not the problem,” one of them reflected in late 2010. 
More fundamentally, in this person’s view, the problem was “that 
program executives spent volumes of time putting together these docu-
ments that had to satisfy all kinds of overlapping requirements and then 
had to be pushed up and up and up through PIC and the rest of the 
system until they got to the Board. They were too dense, too detailed, 
too disjointed. And by the time they were done, they lost all focus on 
the things that mattered most: How does this grant relate to the underly-
ing strategy? How is it going to contribute to impact? To the sustainability of 
the effort? How will it position this work for the time when we are no longer 
there? That information was maybe buried in there someplace — or 
maybe not — but if so, it was buried under a million other things.”
So program staff spent much of 2009 on what one participant described 
as “a re-thinking process that was pretty involved, which started with 
developing criteria for how we should be structured and organized 
internally.” The first major result of that re-thinking came in early 
2010, when the Foundation instituted a new grant-review process in 
which, according to one of its architects, “our grant documents now 
reflect our best thinking about the strategic tie between a grant and a 
goal, and between a grant today and the end of our grantmaking down 
the road. They are designed to highlight questions of grantee capacity 
and sustainability, including what proportion of the grantee’s money 
comes from Atlantic, and who the other donors are, or what other 
donors might be interested, and just generally who our allies are in the 
field. They are designed to highlight questions that are pertinent to 
good grantmaking generally, but also more pertinent to grantmaking in 
the final stages.”
Other observers, however, note that the process is new and still evolv-
ing, and some staff members are reserving judgment on it. Further, as 
the Foundation draws closer to its penultimate and final rounds of com-
mitments, the questions that the reformed process will have to raise and 
answer are likely to continue changing. Even people who consider the 
new process a significant improvement over the one that preceded it 
are not always confident that it will be up to the particular challenges of 
end-stage grantmaking.
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At a minimum, said someone who helped design the new process, “it’s 
a more open forum, in which discussion and debate are expected and 
valued.” All of the changes, this observer reiterated, would have been 
advisable regardless of the Foundation’s expected lifespan. “But if you’re 
preparing to finish all these lines of work, the first thing you need is 
a process that focuses your thinking around that, and doesn’t bog you 
down in the minutiae.” Whether that improvement will meet all the 
Foundation’s needs for reviewing its last phases of work is a question 
that will take more time and experience to answer.
THINKING GEOGRAPHICALLY
The next major change in the way Atlantic managed its program would 
come in the form of a gradual but profound redrawing of its organization 
chart. Ever since 2002, when the Board decided to focus the Foundation 
on four broad themes — Children and Youth, Ageing, Population 
Health, and Reconciliation and Human Rights — most grantmaking had 
been conceived and managed internationally under those four headings. 
A Programme Director managed the worldwide budget in each field, and 
strategies were conceived in a way that linked grantmaking across multi-
ple countries. At least in theory, decisions about programs for children in 
Ireland and those for children in New Mexico were made under a single 
overarching set of strategic guidelines, and their various budgets were 
apportioned from a single allocation. Efforts to promote reconciliation 
between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland were, at least for-
mally, competing for the same budget as projects to ensure rights for gays 
and lesbians in South Africa. In practice, frontline Programme Executives 
retained considerable autonomy in choosing priorities, and strategic plans 
accommodated wide latitude among national contexts and needs. But at 
the level of Board governance and top executive decision-making, the 
unit of analysis was the programmatic theme, not the country in which 
any given activity took place.
This approach had taken shape for two main reasons. First was a desire 
among many Trustees in 2001, supported by then-CEO John R. Healy, 
to bring more focus to a grantmaking program that had previously 
ranged across more than a dozen loosely defined fields. Choosing a 
few disciplines in which the Foundation would try to excel was seen 
as an essential step if the goal was to rack up significant achievements 
in less than two decades. The second rationale for organizing around 
programmatic themes was a desire to promote international learning. 
Despite the obvious differences between easing Catholic-Protestant 
tensions in Northern Ireland and advancing gay rights in South Africa, 
many of the component techniques are actually similar. Building effec-
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tive organizations to promote rights, mobilizing coalitions of support, 
mapping an effective course of legislative advocacy or litigation, mas-
tering the arts of negotiation and reconciliation — all these challenges 
were in some ways universal. Lessons from one place could be beneficial 
to another. (Not coincidentally, Northern Ireland and South Africa had 
an important history of sharing lessons on reconciliation, including a 
small portion with Atlantic support.)
Both of these considerations remained valid in 2010, and the idea of 
international programs therefore retained considerable appeal. But as 
Atlantic’s end date started to come into view, a new set of questions 
were prompting a re-thinking. “This became a very practical, elemen-
tary kind of question for us,” a top executive at the time said around 
mid-year. “How are we going to pull this thing off? How are we going 
to bring all this activity to a conclusion that actually makes an impact, 
that leaves something of lasting value behind? Well, to begin with, how 
do you define impact? How do you define value? It’s defined in a place, 
in a context, in a particular system. We’re not going to change child-
hood, as some kind of big abstraction. But we hope we can change the 
way young children grow up in disadvantaged areas in Ireland, or the 
odds that children will be healthier in underserved communities in the 
United States. And how will we know whether we succeeded? By the 
way the systems of those particular countries and communities respond 
to what we’ve done. Who can tell me whether our work on nursing in 
South Africa is paying off? Our Population Health Director based in 
Viet Nam? Or someone in South Africa? I would argue both, actually 
— but ultimately, it’s going to be decided in South Africa.” 
With those thoughts in mind, the Foundation in 2009 took a first, 
tentative step toward vesting more responsibility in national offices. 
As a kind of experiment, it initially created the post of “Country 
Representative” in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Viet Nam, to provide 
a national perspective — but not formal control — on local grantmak-
ing decisions across programs. This was a relatively easy step, given that 
the designated representative in each place was already a senior man-
ager (a Programme Director in Northern Ireland and Viet Nam, and a 
Senior Vice President in the Republic of Ireland) and each was a figure 
of considerable stature in his respective country. Each had already held 
the largely administrative position of “Head of Office,” responsible 
for managing each office’s local business and accounts. But the brief 
experiment served mainly to prove that a much bigger step was called 
for. It revealed, most of all, that the important questions about strategy 
and priority were increasingly situated at the national level, and that 
the national level would therefore be where pivotal decision-making 
authority ought to reside.
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The prime exception to this rule, so far, has been the United States, 
whose size and concentration of philanthropic activity make “country” 
a more complicated unit of analysis than in other places. The second-
largest country where Atlantic is active, Viet Nam, has a population just 
over one-quarter the size of the United States. And in Viet Nam, nearly 
all of Atlantic’s current grantmaking is concentrated in just one sector: 
health. By contrast, the U.S. grants fall in at least three areas of pro-
gramming, ranging from the vast systems of American education and 
youth services to the large but thinly funded network of U.S. human 
rights organizations to the still-emerging field of aging, whose growth 
in the United States has been significantly attributable to Atlantic’s sup-
port. Each U.S. program operates in a distinctly different world, with 
its own system of law and public policy, its particular mosaic of con-
stituencies, and its distinctive pipelines of funding. This has led some 
to conclude that, within the United States, program teams ought to 
remain the primary units of decision-making, though with greater effort 
by senior managers to foster cross-program activity. Others, however, 
point out that the breadth and complexity of the U.S. programs would 
be the very reason why some form of “integrated management,” as 
one employee put it, “would be even more important than elsewhere. 
If the goal is more cross-program work, you could argue that’s going 
to take more effort and more direction in the U.S. than in the other 
geographies.” In any event, at least as of the end of 2010, the American 
programs continued to report separately to the Senior Vice-President 
for Programmes.
But in nearly all the Foundation’s other major locations — in Viet 
Nam, South Africa, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Cuba — Mr. 
LaMarche had decided by mid-2010 that program strategy should 
henceforth be under the oversight of a Country Director who would 
have authority over priority-setting and budgets. Programme Directors 
would continue to have some international responsibility, primarily 
for promoting communication, networking, and learning among their 
colleagues and grantees worldwide. But most of the major impending 
decisions — among other things, about how the various programs 
would wind down, at what pace, in what order, with what expectations 
about terminal grants — would now mostly be coordinated country-
by-country. Summarizing the change with a hypothetical example, one 
senior officer speculated, “A few years from now, a Country Director 
might say, ‘OK, we have four years left, and given what we still expect 
to accomplish — and recognizing some things we can’t accomplish in 
that amount of time — it looks like we need to do more on children 
and less on aging.’ Or vice-versa. Those are decisions that are very hard 
to make when the main form of organization is by programs. Every 
program is going to protect its turf. But in reality, the actual turf we’re 
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working on is countries. When we leave the world, we are leaving 
countries more than we are leaving issues.” 
The new structure would start officially in January 2011, but unoffi-
cially it was already gearing up by the late months of 2010.
SPELLING OUT PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS
At its second meeting of 2010, in June, the Atlantic Board set aside an 
hour in executive session for an unstructured brainstorming discus-
sion on what members thought “the end of Atlantic” should be — what 
kinds of achievements would constitute (in the words of one early foun-
dation document) “a legacy worthy of the generosity that brought us 
into existence.” Although the impetus for the session had come from 
Board members themselves, senior managers prepared a short memo to 
help frame the discussion, based on three broad questions: 
•	 If	Atlantic	were	to	close	today,	how	would	it	be	remembered?	
What would you like to add to that legacy?
•	 How	can	we	involve	grantees	in	our	planning?
•	 How	does	our	role	as	a	funder	and	our	relationship	with	grantees	
need to change as we move into our final years?
The goal of the session was not to arrive at firm answers, or even con-
crete suggestions of possible answers. It was meant solely to prompt 
Trustees’ imaginations and begin what would presumably be a lon-
ger discussion. Yet most participants agreed that, although these 
were reasonable hopes, the session did not come close to fulfilling 
them. The issue, as one Trustee put it, “was just too open-ended and 
vague. This is a very practical Board; we’re not the kind of people 
who do well with these kinds of paint-the-rainbow discussions.” And 
although the goal had been far from “painting the rainbow” — it was 
in fact supposed to lead to some initial assumptions or guideposts 
from which staff members could formulate more specific plans and 
proposals — the discussion did end up drifting, with several mem-
bers musing, in no particular order, on grants or programs that had 
impressed them, or that struck them as closest to the Foundation’s 
core principles. Others speculated about new types of grantmaking, 
such as endowments, fellowships, or donations of capital assets, that 
might be appropriate to the final years of operation. Mr. Feeney, who 
took a central role at the meeting, raised questions about how to focus 
on what he had often referred to as the “highest and best use” of the 
remaining funds, and whether the current program strategies were in 
fact meeting that standard. But the session ended with little more than 
an agreement to continue the discussion.
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Reflecting on the meeting several months later, one participant con-
cluded that establishing options for the final years, and laying out 
possible paths for completing the work of the various programs, was 
really the responsibility of the staff, which could devote sustained, 
multidisciplinary thought to developing and fleshing out possibili-
ties for the Board’s consideration. “There have naturally been several 
ideas that have surfaced from Board meetings,” one staff member said, 
“for example, an interest in supporting long-term leadership, perhaps 
through fellowship grants. The Board has always played a major role 
in raising opportunities and stimulating strategic thinking. But Boards 
as a rule can’t be expected to hammer out the mechanics of how a pro-
gram fits together — or, in this case, how it closes down. That’s what 
we have staff for.” The Board could more easily make choices and raise 
additional issues or ideas, executives reasoned, if there were first a few 
concrete propositions set before them. 
Senior staff members had in fact already been at work developing 
a set of propositions and a proposed framework for planning that 
would guide the Foundation through its remaining years. The first 
step, as top executives saw it, would be to establish what one of them 
called “baseline principles” and another called “underlying assump-
tions” that would set at least rough boundaries on the next stage of 
planning. As the brainstorming session had made clear, the possible 
scenarios under which Atlantic might conceivably wind down were, 
at least in theory, almost limitless. It could begin closing down pro-
grams or offices almost immediately, concentrating more and more 
resources on the ones that survived, or even setting aside some of the 
freed-up resources for whole new areas of activity. Or it could hold all 
current grantmaking to a reduced level, in the hope of making large, 
endowment-like grants at the end. Or it might take any of a dozen 
other courses. But realistically, the grantmaking program was not a 
tabula rasa; it was based on financial models, strategic plans, and fund-
ing relationships that were already mature and in which Atlantic had 
invested heavily, with both its financial resources and the soft capital 
of its credibility and leadership. To be realistic, and to honor strate-
gic and financial commitments the Board had already made, planners 
would need to work within a narrower range of options. A first step, 
therefore, was to be more explicit about the boundaries within which 
the next set of choices would be made.
That effort came together between the June and September Board 
meetings, when, as one senior staff member at the time put it, “we tried 
to set out those things that we thought it was important to have a com-
mon understanding of. These weren’t non-negotiables cast in stone, 
obviously. Circumstances could change and events or new informa-
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tion might cause some of these things to be re-opened. But we needed 
to have some idea of which ideas were more or less settled and which 
ones still had to be thought through.” The result was a presentation by 
Marcia Smith, then Atlantic’s Senior Vice President for Programme, 
to an executive session of the Board’s September meeting, containing a 
rough timeline for the final stages of activity and a set of nine “assump-
tions” about the remaining years of the Foundation’s life. 
Following a format that Mr. LaMarche had originally laid out in his 
2008 paper, the timeline divided the years 2008 through 2020 into three 
main phases. The first, already under way, was a period of planning and 
organizing that would culminate in a set of terminal plans, which senior 
executives envisioned being finished by the end of 2011. These plans 
would spell out how each national team outside the United States, and 
each U.S. program, would focus its strategy and think through its final 
commitments during the timeline’s second phase, ending in 2016. Other 
organizational units, especially Human Resources, would develop parallel 
plans to support the national and programmatic teams in those same 
years. The final phase, from 2017 through 2020, would consist mainly of 
disbursing and monitoring the final grants, collecting and disseminating 
lessons learned, and closing down Atlantic’s physical operation. 
The remainder of the presentation listed nine assumptions, quoted here 
verbatim, about the future of Atlantic’s program planning and operations:
•	 We	will	remain	in	all	geographies	until	2016,	given	current	
political conditions, though the programme mix in each may 
change.
•	 We	will	concentrate	on	fewer	areas	of	focus	within	each	pro-
gramme and geography between 2011 and 2016.
•	 Programme	staff	will	identify	areas	of	impact	and	focus	under	
the leadership of CDs/PDs [Country Directors and Programme 
Directors] and senior management and in consultation with the 
Board.
•	 If	our	portfolio	performs	as	expected,	we	will	maintain	a	rela-
tively even level of grant commitments until 2016: $290 million 
in 2011 and 2012, and $325 million each year from 2013 to 2016.
•	 Toward	the	end,	we	will	award	fewer	but	larger	grants.	Among	
other things, we will focus on strengthening individual leadership 
through mechanisms such as fellowships.
•	 We	will	cease	active	grantmaking	by	the	end	of	2016	and	close	
the doors to Atlantic as we know it in 2020.
•	 We	will	strive	to	maintain	and	improve	the	ratio	of	operations	to	
grant spending through 2016, after which operations spending 
and grant payouts will decline significantly. 
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3. Marcia A. Smith, “Executive Session: Spend-Down Planning” (slide presentation to the Atlantic 
Philanthropies’ Board of Directors, 21 September 2010), slides 3-5.
•	 We	will	create	an	exit	and	development	plan	for	each	individual	
[employee] that balances the needs of the organization and goals 
of the individual.
•	 The	composition	and	role	of	the	Board	will	adjust	as	the	strate-
gies are implemented and final grants are made.3
“A lot of what we presented was not new,” Ms. Smith explained later. 
“But the reason we did a full presentation, with not just assumptions but 
a timeline, was because we thought we ought to be explicit about what we 
understood to be the fundamentals. In some cases, they’d been written 
and discussed, but not necessarily incorporated into the way the staff and 
Board members were thinking and talking about our work.” It was a way, 
another staff member said, of “making the unspoken things spoken, just 
in case there was anything that had been unclear or overlooked.”
REACHING FOR CLARITY 
Even if most of the assumptions were not altogether new, several of 
them had been matters of some ambivalence among members of both 
the Board and the staff. The Board discussion no doubt helped to 
clarify many of the uncertainties, but it did not dispel them completely. 
For example, members of both groups still questioned whether Atlantic 
would really “remain in all geographies” until the end. Some continued 
to speculate that one or more national offices might close before 2016 
or 2020. Also, some staff members — and many grantees — had hoped 
the Foundation might award a series of very large grants toward the 
end, either as endowments or as capital funds that could be invested and 
would last many years. At least one Trustee had envisioned carving out 
portions of the endowment and the program portfolio and conferring 
them, as a package, on some recipient organization that would carry on 
that part of the Foundation’s work. Ms. Smith’s list of assumptions did 
not rule any of these things out (the phrase “fewer but larger grants” 
could include major gifts of various kinds), though the expectation of “a 
relatively even level of grant commitments” would make it mathemati-
cally unlikely that there would be a great burst of endowments or large 
capital grants at the end, or that significant parts of the portfolio would 
be carved away in the meantime.
Ms. Smith’s presentation drew no substantive objections at the Board 
meeting, and the discussion was generally supportive. It was meant to 
evoke a general consensus, not to lead to a formal vote, and for that 
purpose both staff and Board members regarded it as a success. Some 
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Trustees, both at the meeting and later, expressed a desire to revisit 
the assumptions regularly, on the grounds, as one Board member put 
it, that “all of these assumptions are based on current conditions, and 
conditions can change.” “The reaction was generally favorable,” said 
another Trustee, “but it was just the opening round. We’ll need a lot 
more documents developed, and further discussion as we move ahead.”
But others who participated in the session, and staff members who took 
part in preparing the presentation, believed that the assumptions were 
intended as premises for future rounds of documents and discussion, not 
to be the topic for ongoing debate themselves. “There have to be some 
things that are considered settled for some period of time,” a staff mem-
ber said, “or else you can’t move on to the next things. I think we made 
a lot of progress on that. Of course the Board may raise some of these 
questions again. But the time for making basic decisions is short; there are 
a lot of follow-on decisions that we are going to have to make in the next 
few years, and they need to proceed from some common understandings. 
These aren’t just ideas; they’re meant to be principles, and if they are 
revisited, it should be because something significant has changed.”
These differing interpretations of what happened at the September 
meeting may be the natural consequence of highly engaged Trustees 
slowly coming to grips with the reality that, at some point in the near 
future, it will be too late to revisit some key choices. The September 
discussion and its attendant uncertainties reflect, among other things, 
a unique challenge in bringing a philanthropic enterprise to a close: 
The nearer the institution comes to its end date, the harder it will be 
to change course in any fundamental way. Trustees understood, and 
some argued forcefully, that any significant changes in the Foundation’s 
direction, strategy, and aims needed to be taken soon, to allow time for 
those changes to be translated into a smooth stream of grant decisions 
in the remaining years. That understanding would bring about further 
significant review of the program, and have profound consequences for 
Atlantic’s governance and executive leadership, in the months ahead. 
But for now, staff and Trustees broadly agreed that the success of the 
Foundation’s late years depended mightily on establishing a settled and 
consistent program strategy for the last five to six years of activity. And 
they were committed to bringing that about.
Foundation programs and strategies often entail making multiyear 
promises to governments and other funders, forging difficult alliances 
among grantees and other organizations, adding new staff to grantees’ 
payrolls, enrolling disadvantaged and vulnerable people in services that 
they may come to rely on, and other acts with long-term consequences. 
They often can’t be halted or upended on short notice. At some point, 
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when a foundation’s life is short, decisions with these kinds of multiyear 
implications become close to final, because unwinding them would take 
longer than the foundation has left. With six to ten years of activity still 
ahead, Atlantic had not reached that point at the end of 2010. But Ms. 
Smith’s timeline showed that the Foundation was approaching a phase 
of planning and budgeting whose key decisions, once made, would set in 
motion activity that would be increasingly hard to reverse. Setting prem-
ises for those hard-to-change decisions — the ostensible purpose of the 
September presentation — was meant to be a first step, an early sign that 
the nature of decision-making at Atlantic would gradually be changing.  
UPDATING THE STAFF
Unlike Trustees, Foundation staff are immersed in these realities day-
to-day, and are consequently more attuned to — and in some cases 
more anxious about — the limits and uncertainties that limited life 
introduces into a foundation’s work. Consequently, soon after the 
Trustees’ September meeting, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, then the chair 
of the Board, and Mr. LaMarche and Ms. Smith, along with other 
senior officers, took a prime opportunity to present the timeline and 
assumptions to the whole staff.
Atlantic periodically gathers nearly all of its 130 employees from around 
the world at a meeting to review recent events and think together about 
the months ahead. During the 2010 meeting, for the first time ever, 
the agenda set aside an hour to discuss how the Foundation would 
begin planning for the end of its life. Although the topic had arisen 
at earlier staff meetings, and senior officers had discussed some of the 
major issues with smaller groups of employees, an afternoon session on 
October 6 would be the first opportunity for the whole staff to hear, at 
the same time, how the Atlantic Board and top executives were think-
ing about the last six to ten years of their institution’s life. At the core of 
the session was a replay of the presentation Ms. Smith had made to the 
Board two weeks earlier. 
The issue of how the Foundation planned to complete its grantmaking 
had been the subject of broad speculation, and in some cases uneasi-
ness, among staff members for some time. In interviews for this report, 
and for the one that preceded it in 2009, several staff members had 
expressed concerns not so much about their own jobs, which they all 
knew would end in a few years’ time, but about the future of their pro-
gram strategies and grant commitments, and (at least by implication) 
about the odds that they would be able to complete their work suc-
cessfully as planned. Ms. Smith’s presentation dealt with some of these 
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questions — the ones that could be answered at this point — but senior 
executives also expected a number of issues to arise from the floor that 
could be dealt with only in broad or hypothetical terms. To prepare for 
these matters as well as possible, they prepared a set of talking points 
in the form of possible questions and answers. In the actual discussion, 
most of the expected issues never arose, though a few did:
Q. Is there still going to be a Spend-Down Committee (there was talk 
about setting up a committee a year ago)? Who will be managing the 
spend-down planning?
A. The work will likely entail active involvement by two groups. 
First, the programme leadership, who — working with senior 
leadership and in consultation with the Board — will shape our 
programme plans for our remaining years and will make decisions 
on how and when to exit certain areas of the work. The second is 
the Senior Leadership group, which together will work to ensure 
that all the various streams of [concluding] work — including pro-
grammes, human resources, investments, legal, communications, 
and operations — are coordinated with staff across the organization 
as decisions are made.
Q. Will certain offices and/or programmes close before 2016?
A. There are no plans to close any offices prior to 2016. As far 
as programmes go, it’s difficult to predict how the work will 
evolve under the [new] country structure, and we expect that the 
programme mix in each country may evolve and that more cross-
programme work will emerge over time. But again, there is no 
intention to close any single programme before 2016.
Q. Will some people’s jobs be eliminated before 2016? 
A. It is possible that some roles may become unnecessary as time 
moves on, but it is not possible at this stage to predict which roles 
and in what time frame.
Q. When and how will we find out our personal timeframe and exit plans?
A. This will be part of the larger planning process so the timing is 
linked to the overall [final-years] plan in each geography and area 
of the organization. Your manager and H.R. [the Human Resources 
department] will discuss with you the details of your exit plan and 
timing when this information is available. 
Q. Will we endow certain grantees?
A. We have no specific plan in place at this point, but part of the 
work of the programmes and geographies going forward will be to 
determine how best we can ensure the sustainability of our grantees 
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and the fields we work in beyond Atlantic’s lifetime. It is possible 
that we may consider strategies such as endowments or fellowships 
as part of that work.
Q. When will we have a more fleshed-out plan for spend-down?
A. We expect that plans will evolve and unfold in a few phases. 
Between now and the end of next year, we will focus on organizing 
ourselves for the final years of operation. As part of that work, the 
geography and programme teams will spend part of next year develop-
ing five-year plans. While we know that these plans will need to stay 
somewhat fungible so we can respond to new opportunities, they will 
provide a roadmap for how we will focus our work in each area and 
geography between now and 2016. … As we make progress, we will 
continue to keep you regularly updated.
SEEING THAT CAUSES ENDURE
The topic of grantees’ sustainability — their prospects of surviving not 
only the withdrawal of Atlantic funding, but other adversity a decade 
or more into the future— arose often in both the Board and staff dis-
cussions in the autumn of 2010. On one hand, Atlantic had for most of 
its life been deliberate about finding funding partners for every major 
initiative that it supported, and most elements of the program had 
explicit plans for long-term funding built into their written strategies. 
On the other hand, these funding plans and relationships sometimes 
related only to the specific activity that Atlantic was supporting, not to 
the survival of the larger organizations carrying out those activities. As 
the Sternlieb-Walsh analysis pointed out, the long-term uncertainties 
were greater in programs like Ageing or Reconciliation and Human 
Rights, where other sources of support were relatively scarce and gov-
ernments were often not realistic sources of major funding. (As one 
Human Rights staffer put it, “we obviously don’t want the govern-
ment as the primary funder of organizations whose purpose is to hold 
the government to account.”) In countries such as Ireland and South 
Africa, where private philanthropy was less robust than in the United 
States, and where government budgets were under stress, grantees’ 
dependency on Atlantic ran particularly high. Even in fast-growing 
Viet Nam and philanthropy-rich America, it was far from certain 
that Foundation grantees would be able to hold the interest of major 
funders, whether public or private, once Atlantic’s money and influ-
ence had faded away. 
WINDING DOWN 
THE ATLANTIC
PHILANTHROPIES
2009–2010: BEGINNING
THE ENDGAME
PRINCIPLE
20
Nor were all the challenges solely about money. Some of the organiza-
tions carrying out Atlantic-supported projects would need experienced 
management consulting and other technical advice to help them re-
engineer their organizations for a (probably leaner) post-Atlantic 
existence. Some might need to merge or downsize; for others the choice 
might be to expand or die. Outside the United States, most of the 
countries where Atlantic operates have few technical resources or con-
sultancies that could help organizations understand and manage those 
kinds of challenges. Building a management- and technical-support sys-
tem would therefore be another aspect of sustainability that would need 
attention. Solutions and experiments were beginning to emerge in a few 
places but still had much farther to go.
Admittedly, in a few cases the work Atlantic was supporting might 
well be substantially finished by 2020, making sustainability some-
what less of a concern. For example, long-running experiments in 
early-intervention services for disadvantaged children and families 
in Ireland would have reached the end of their trial period by that 
time. Analysis of the data would be well under way or complete, and 
the intended outcome of the project — solid evidence of whether 
these services are effective — would by itself stand as an important 
Dependency on Atlantic by Programme
Source: Sternlieh & Walsh
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contribution by Atlantic to the field of children’s services worldwide. 
Yet even in that case, Foundation staff clearly hoped to do more than 
publish a research report and walk away. If the study found early-
intervention services to be valuable, they would prefer to know that 
the Irish government was committed to keeping these services afloat 
and expanding them to reach more families. So even when projects 
could be regarded as time-limited and on track to produce complete, 
tangible results by 2020, the greater aspirations behind those projects 
might still be far from realized. And of course, in the majority of the 
Foundation’s areas of interest — improving primary health care in 
Viet Nam, securing basic rights for poor rural families in South Africa, 
promoting civil liberties in Ireland and Northern Ireland, expand-
ing productive opportunities for older adults in several countries, and 
dozens of other interests — Atlantic’s work would not be finished, 
in any important sense, when the last of its grants was disbursed and 
spent. What would happen after that?
To some extent, each program and field of activity had begun formulat-
ing its own answers to that question, although several of these were still 
tentative and exploratory. But as discussions about final grants, impact, 
and legacy intensified in 2009 and 2010, many staff members and top 
executives came to believe that ensuring grantees’ capacity to endure 
and grow beyond Atlantic’s lifetime should be an institution-wide con-
cern. In September 2010, the Foundation created a Capacity-Building 
Unit that it described as a team “of communications, advocacy, orga-
nizational development, and fundraising experts who provide support 
for the foundation’s programs and grantees, and recommend external 
resources on the ground in each country where Atlantic operates.” 
The Foundation hired Fran Barrett, a nationally recognized leader 
in nonprofit management, to set up the unit and begin mobilizing an 
institution-wide response to the sustainability challenge that would last 
through 2016 and beyond.
Overall, it could be argued that 2010 was the year in which the main 
locus of planning for the end of The Atlantic Philanthropies emerged 
from the individual program teams to encompass the Foundation’s 
full institutional management and Board. In some of the Foundation’s 
supportive services— especially financial management and strategic 
learning and evaluation — terminal planning had already been under 
way for some time at the institutional level. But in the grantmaking 
divisions — the work a senior officer described as “driv[ing] all the 
other organizational functions” — the vision for Atlantic’s last years, its 
final achievements, and its hopes of leaving a legacy had not yet been 
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addressed institution-wide in any sustained way. Instead, these issues 
had thus far all been worked out in separate silos, program-by-program. 
Those individual efforts would need to continue, of course, and prob-
ably even expand as the end approached. But beginning in 2010, the 
programs’ separate decisions would increasingly fit into an overall insti-
tutional context, leading to more integrated planning, cross-program 
philanthropy, and coordinated attempts to brace the Foundation’s fields 
of investment for the inevitability of its departure. 
But that story essentially remains to be written, beginning with events 
whose practical effect will not be felt until 2011 and beyond. To appre-
ciate the issues that individual programs have been grappling with up 
to now, the next section describes how two of the programs, Children 
and Youth and Population Health, have approached the demands of 
finishing their work and grappled with the particular challenges that a 
limited-life mission poses in their respective fields and countries.
Dependency on Atlantic by Geography
Source: Sternlieh & Walsh
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A. CHANGING COURSE FOR CHILDREN  
AND YOUTH IN THE U.S.
Soon after Atlantic decided, in 2002, on the four fields in which it 
would concentrate its grantmaking, teams of program employees set out 
to draft detailed strategies in each field for the Board’s review. Members 
of these teams recall a careful effort to focus on possible lines of grant-
making that would particularly suit what was then a 15- to 20-year 
projected lifespan. “Limited life was the overall framework for all that 
planning,” one participant said, “and we didn’t seriously consider any-
thing that didn’t fit into that.” Yet although all the final plans outlined 
work that would accommodate a roughly 15-year schedule, almost 
none of them dealt specifically with how and when each effort would 
end. One reason, several people suggested, is that other than choosing 
challenges that could plausibly be met within two decades, these initial 
planning exercises were not much different from those undertaken at 
most perpetual foundations. They sought to outline significant goals, to 
plan a vigorous pursuit of those goals, and to make a lasting difference 
by the time they were done. Exactly how and when they would finish, 
with exactly what amounts of outlays in exactly which years, as one staff 
member put it, “would just have been guesswork at that point. It was 
too far away for that kind of precision, and no one really expected it.”
One exception to that rule, however, was in the program then known 
as Disadvantaged Children and Youth, or DCY. In early 2003, as staff 
members planned the central component of the program in the United 
States, initially known as Integrated Services in Schools, they created 
a precise working timetable for virtually the whole expected life of the 
initiative. It was specific as to annual objectives, grant amounts, and per-
formance measurement for each of the first ten years, and only slightly 
more general in envisioning a gradual conclusion to the program begin-
ning in Year 11. (Program plans for Ireland and Bermuda, and some 
2.
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other elements of the American program, were similarly decade-long 
in scope, but at that stage were less precise about year-by-year activity, 
or about the future beyond Year 10.) “We made a detailed plan,” a key 
participant in those years explained, “with significantly large sums every 
year, predicated on grantees meeting mid-term metrics that we had spe-
cifically targeted for years three, four and five. … We set it up to ramp 
up, measure results year-by-year; there was a peak period and then a 
wind-down trailing down to the end. There were cash-flow projections 
absolutely modeled out. There were strategic milestones associated with 
all the pivotal points.”
This level of detail, as staff members recall it, was kept mostly in the 
background and used as a kind of internal road map. It was not pre-
sented in full to the Board (although a program update in 2005 did 
present five years’ worth of annual budget and outcome forecasts, 
drawn from the longer-term framework.) But it had a critical effect on 
the way much of the U.S. DCY program was structured and managed 
in the early years. 
The initiative mapped out in this plan was later re-named Elev8. It 
began with an RFP in 2005, from which four sites were chosen: the cit-
ies of Baltimore, Chicago, and Oakland, and the state of New Mexico. 
A year of site-by-site planning followed in 2006. In each place, the 
model called for the Foundation to make large, multiyear commit-
ments based on service agreements with multiple providers and public 
school systems, including detailed matching or co-funding agreements 
with other philanthropies and with state and local governments. The 
plans for each site placed particular emphasis on preteens and early 
adolescents, age 10-16, who were having trouble in school and begin-
ning to “exhibit signs of disconnection.” Atlantic grants would “support 
proven programs, demonstrate their robustness, and link them to the 
policy world.”4 A prime objective was to bring some 50 major direct-
service and intermediary organizations into closer cooperation with one 
another and with state and local governments, school systems, and com-
munity groups in each site, establishing patterns of coordination and 
interaction that the Foundation hoped would endure and be replicated 
elsewhere. Operations began two sites at a time, starting in 2007, with 
New Mexico and Chicago the first out of the gate. Oakland followed 
soon thereafter, and Baltimore was last.
Throughout the whole Disadvantaged Children and Youth strategy, 
one point of particular emphasis was before- and after-school activi-
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ties. These were, at the time, a fast-growing branch of the American 
youth-services field, and they were attracting increasing support from 
governments and foundations. Atlantic’s interest in out-of-school-time 
programs extended well beyond Elev8, because of mounting research 
showing that these programs could be beneficial in improving young 
people’s development. But out-of-school-time activities played an espe-
cially prominent role in Elev8’s vision of integrated services, because 
they provided a point of strategic convergence where schools, families, 
youth groups, social service agencies, and community development 
organizations could work together on common goals. 
By strengthening and weaving together these various strands of work, 
Atlantic hoped to create a rich array of programs, activities, and adult 
guidance, concentrated in places of particularly acute need and specifi-
cally aimed at young people whose life paths were verging on trouble. 
The service organizations would work together in a few carefully chosen 
communities within each city or state, with coordination and technical 
help from designated intermediaries. Together they would create a web 
of services, all targeting essentially the same children in the same com-
munities, using the local schools as anchors. They would incorporate 
education, after-school, mentoring, health, community service, and other 
efforts to promote healthy physical, intellectual, and social development. 
Atlantic would support the integration and expansion of this network of 
activities in each place and fund rigorous evaluations of many of their 
activities. One major element, for example, was the creation of school-
based health centers in each locality — a significant capital investment 
for both the Foundation and the local education and health systems, but 
also a major step toward ensuring that children could get health ser-
vices where they spent most of their day. Along the way, grantees would 
mobilize local organizations and families, helping them to become more 
active participants in the provision and improvement of services. In the 
longer term, this growing constituency was intended to become a voice of 
advocacy for better services and public policy, with the support of major 
national policy and advocacy organizations that would also become grant-
ees of the program. 
The design was something like a finely engineered machine, in which 
the component parts were carefully selected and fitted together. These 
included premier national organizations like Big Brothers Big Sisters 
and Boys and Girls Clubs, rising stars like the Knowledge Is Power 
Program [KIPP], and smaller but expanding high-performers like 
Citizen Schools and The After-School Corporation. In the first year 
or two, some grantees and Foundation staff spoke of the model as a 
“Gold Standard,” whose “pure” execution — with the complete ros-
ter of organizations on site, working together in exactly the prescribed 
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ways — was essential for success. Although this vision of total standard-
ization was relatively short-lived (local intermediaries occasionally ran 
into trouble integrating all the approved organizations into their com-
munities exactly as planned), Elev8 was at heart a kind of all-or-nothing 
proposition. It was not meant to strengthen school-based health cen-
ters, counseling services, or after-school programs as particular entities; 
it was meant to demonstrate the value of weaving all of them into a 
coherent whole. 
The vision was as expansive and ambitious as the implementation plan 
was precise and complex. But it was always somewhat controversial 
within Atlantic. Indeed, many people believe the initiative was rushed 
toward a premature implementation for fear that support for it might 
erode (as, in fact, it did). What Elev8’s early supporters saw as an auda-
cious “big bet” — exactly the kind of high-stakes philanthropy that the 
Foundation’s limited life was intended to make possible — others came 
to regard as an enormous gamble. The vision of local schools as hubs 
of family and community services had been frustrating reformers for 
at least four decades (the Ford Foundation had supported an early ver-
sion of this same model in New Haven, called Community Schools, 
as early as 1962, with mostly disappointing results). For most of that 
time, successes had been few and fleeting, and it was not clear why the 
current moment would prove any more fertile. By the time full imple-
mentation began, in 2007, doubts about the expansive ambitions behind 
Elev8 were coming to the fore, and its lifespan was shortened by two 
years. A year later, as the staff and Board prepared for a new round of 
strategic planning, the remaining timeline was cut in half. The intri-
cately designed ten-year initiative was now a four-year foray, with plans 
beyond these first four years left deliberately unspecified (although 
many grantees say they were given reason to believe their support 
would continue beyond Year 4).
By 2008, senior officers and Trustees had lost confidence that Elev8’s 
many intended alliances and goals would be achievable, and even if they 
were, many doubted that they could truly create the advocacy engine 
the original designers foresaw. Many things had happened in the inter-
vening four or five years that made the intricacy and precision of the 
initial framework seem far-fetched. For starters, there had been adverse 
fiscal or political developments in some of the chosen jurisdictions, 
and the focus of national policy had been drifting away from some of 
Elev8’s central preoccupations. Meanwhile, senior managers increas-
ingly doubted the wisdom of the original ten-year calendar, which they 
believed left both the Foundation and the grantees too little latitude to 
respond to changes in local or national priorities along the way. While 
a few individual pieces of the initiative were showing real promise, par-
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ticularly the out-of-school-time programs,5 the totality struck many 
people as overly complex, rigid, and unwieldy. When a new director, 
Donna Lawrence, took over the Children and Youth portfolio that year, 
she set off on a thorough review of Elev8 to determine which parts 
should be preserved and which pared away.
When she submitted her findings in mid-2009, Trustees were pleased to 
see that they were not nearly as bleak as some skeptics had feared. “In 
spite of some significant operational challenges,” she reported, “Elev8 
carries the seeds of a dynamic, influential initiative — one which, with 
some revision, can continue to be a cornerstone of the [Children and 
Youth] Programme going forward.”6 She had particular praise for the 
initiative’s “high-quality school-based health centers that provide com-
prehensive, confidential adolescent health care, including dental and 
mental health services.”7 Seven such centers had already been built in 
New Mexico and Chicago, and seven more were in the works across all 
four sites. 
Nonetheless, the “operational challenges” included a number of basic 
design flaws that Ms. Lawrence and other senior managers believed 
would call for far-reaching revisions. Among other things, the rush 
to launch the initiative in conformance to the ten-year timetable 
had meant that the Foundation had struck less favorable deals than 
it might have with local school districts and other public authori-
ties. The original plan had also concentrated most of its attention 
on young people’s social development, while national debates were 
increasingly centered on educational achievement. “Elev8, apart 
from other significant reforms, cannot improve the quality of educa-
tion provided in the schools,” Ms. Lawrence wrote. “Our failure to 
articulate the reality that comprehensive school-based services are 
necessary but not sufficient has meant that Elev8 remained apart from 
main currents of education reform and significantly limited our ability 
to impact national debates.”8 But the most general and fundamental 
problem Ms. Lawrence found was with Elev8’s rigidity: a “top-down,” 
“prescriptive,” approach tied to “national, rather than local, provid-
ers” that “underestimated the unique social, structural, and political 
challenges in each community” and “unintentionally displaced local 
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providers.” The specificity of the original blueprint “left no room to 
address other issues of concern to the children and families who were 
the targets of the initiative.”
Yet for all these perceived shortcomings, Ms. Lawrence’s overall picture 
was of an essentially sound idea, even if one that was hemmed in by 
too restrictive and detailed a preliminary design. She envisioned not an 
end to Elev8 but a “re-tooled” effort with much less uniformity from 
place to place and more flexibility about how long it would continue. 
“Re-tooling Elev8 would involve work to redesign three aspects of the 
initiative: the community-level operational components, the intermedi-
ary structures, and the vertical thread from the Elev8 sites to national 
policy.”9 With those changes, she predicted, Elev8 could become “an 
integral component of the enduring local advocacy capacity for children 
and families that we hope will be Atlantic’s legacy.”10
It should be noted that a similarly ambitious approach to Children 
and Youth had also been taking shape in Ireland in these same years. 
Like the original design of its U.S. counterpart, the Irish branch of the 
program involved the co-location of multiple service providers (center-
based child care, mentoring, literacy, parental counseling, and more) 
in areas of concentrated need, with guidance from intermediaries and 
sophisticated evaluations by university-based researchers. It included 
a parallel effort to strengthen the communities’ ability to advocate for 
their own interests. In Ireland’s strategy, the particular emphasis was 
on a mix of services intended (a) to strengthen families and promote 
healthy development in young children so as to prevent later problems, 
and (b) to intervene early when problems start to become manifest. In 
a diagram or Logic Model, the Irish program’s approach to prevention 
and early intervention for young children would have seemed just as 
complex as the U.S. model, where the emphasis was on slightly older 
children. But there were significant differences beyond the age groups 
being targeted. 
First, and most important, Ireland is a much smaller country (its entire 
population is roughly equivalent to that of two Elev8 sites) with a national 
Office for Children and Youth Affairs that is far more influential in chil-
dren’s policy and service provision than is any single public agency in the 
United States. The Irish government was a key partner in the design and 
evaluation of Atlantic’s DCY program from the beginning and was com-
mitted to seeing it through. Second, the program’s goal was not primarily 
the integration of services, as it was in Elev8. Instead, the aim was to 
instill research and evidence more deeply into the way Ireland’s govern-
9. Ibid., p. 15.
10.Ibid., p. 4.
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ment agencies and nongovernmental service providers approached their 
work. That goal did not depend on the imposition of an unwavering 
“Gold Standard” model in all locations, but could accommodate con-
siderable variation from site to site and over time. Unlike its American 
counterpart, the Irish program did not begin with a fully formed imple-
mentation plan stretching out over the ensuing decade. Instead, it started 
with considerable exploratory work and evolved organically over its first 
several years. It has put a premium on adaptability and local leadership, 
offering extensive technical and organizational support to help commu-
nity organizations and service providers adopt and apply research findings 
to their local needs as the intervention progresses.11 
In Elev8, by contrast, many of these advantages were lacking or in 
doubt. There was no overarching U.S. government authority to join 
Atlantic in designing and implementing an initiative. While Atlantic 
was by far Ireland’s largest philanthropy and a singularly influential 
voice in national affairs, its American efforts would take place amid a 
vast and crowded arena of heavy hitters in children’s services, including 
many big foundations, national nonprofits, think tanks, academic insti-
tutions, civic and religious groups, and public agencies at every level. 
The U.S. demonstration sites were also much more diverse than those 
in Ireland. They were spread across nearly 3,000 miles and included 
sharply different government systems, funding arrangements, and 
political environments, while their Irish counterparts were clustered 
around a single city and subject to nearly identical public authority. Yet 
the design and goals of the U.S. demonstrations were in many respects 
more rigidly uniform than was the case in Ireland. 
The original designers of the U.S. program were almost certainly right 
that achieving a meaningful integration of national and local service 
providers, funders, intermediaries, and researchers across this vast land-
scape would take at least ten years and dozens of millions of dollars. 
And by the time the first sites started operating, the plan was already a 
couple of years along in its execution. Unless the Foundation remained 
confidently committed to the goal, and willing to absorb the risk that 
the vision might be too ambitious or need much more time to jell, 
program managers would have to pull back and redesign Elev8 very 
quickly. They would otherwise risk leaving themselves too little time to 
design and implement an alternative.
For the remainder of 2009 and into 2010, Foundation staff struggled to 
revamp Elev8, and with it much of the U.S. children’s program. By the 
WINDING DOWN 
THE ATLANTIC
PHILANTHROPIES
2009–2010: BEGINNING
THE ENDGAME
PROGRAM
30
time the revisions were done, and a new program strategy was approved 
by the Board in late 2009, Elev8 was a shorter, more flexible initiative 
with narrower goals and more opportunity for local actors to shape tac-
tics at the front lines. It remained a core element of the Atlantic strategy 
for Children and Youth and incorporated that strategy’s two nationwide 
goals: promoting reform to school disciplinary policies and expanding 
health coverage for young people. Clarifying and updating that broader 
strategy, including elements outside of Elev8, constituted a second 
phase of work for Ms. Lawrence and the staff, which was largely com-
pleted at the end of 2009. Implementation began in 2010.
One thing that had not changed, of course, was the finish line. The Elev8 
initiative was originally designed to run at full force for ten years, through 
2013, and then spend a few years closing down, along with the rest of 
the Foundation. At least in theory, the new program design — includ-
ing some or all of the Elev8 activity — could entail grant commitments 
all the way to 2016. Yet now that deadline would be at most seven years 
away, not ten or 15. And in reality, the timeline would be even shorter, 
because the new goals, partners, and methods would all have to be phased 
in or reoriented gradually. Many grant commitments from the old strat-
egy were still being honored. Grantees would need time to absorb and 
adjust to the new plan, and some would not fit in. Their expectation of 
support from Atlantic beyond the first four years — along with assurances 
they may have given to other funders, governments, constituents in the 
field, and allies at the front lines — would have to be revised. What the 
original plan foresaw as an “exit risk” — the danger that Atlantic’s depar-
ture might be destabilizing for some of the participating organizations if 
it withdrew support too suddenly — would now be an immediate chal-
lenge to be managed, not a remote possibility. By one estimate, honoring 
commitments and making exit grants to organizations that didn’t fit the 
new strategy took up close to half the budget for the U.S. children’s pro-
gram in 2010, and a declining portion in 2011 and 2012. 
Yet even then, as one observer notes, “it’s going to be a more abrupt 
and smaller exit than they were expecting.” The Elev8 grantees had 
been made aware, some years earlier, that the initiative might well come 
to an end when their fourth year of operation was over. So they were 
at least prepared for a change, even if not necessarily sure what might 
lay beyond it. Grantees in other parts of the program, including some 
out-of-school-time organizations outside of Elev8, had less notice of a 
shift in course. They would need some transitional support and time to 
determine whether they could continue or would have to close. 
In 2010 and 2011, Elev8 grantees began to get the news that further 
Atlantic support , beyond the four years they had been promised, might 
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now be a possibility, even if at a significantly reduced level. Yet that 
welcome news came to many of them as just one more shock along 
a path that they had once thought had been fully mapped out for at 
least a decade. “It’s been sort of a roller-coaster ride,” one grantee said, 
“from ‘This is going to be the biggest commitment ever!’ to [rumors 
of] ‘We’re closing the whole thing down!’ to now, ‘This is going to be 
smaller but better.’ And look, this isn’t our first grant ever. We know 
foundations change their minds sometimes. We can work with this, and 
we’re still proud that they want to keep working with us.” Said another, 
“They’re still giving us support to do some very important things that 
we really wanted to do. And they’re being careful to prevent it from 
being an abrupt drop-off [in funding]. So it’s not quite what we were 
expecting at first, but we can still do valuable things.”
In planning for the abbreviated time span remaining, Atlantic staff 
members felt they would have to be doubly vigilant to focus their 
efforts, as one of the key planners put it, “on where we could, in the 
time we have left, have a significant impact. The spend-down was 
really looming over that piece of it. … It was clear that the timeframe 
of a limited life forced us to keep going back, over and over, and 
thinking, How do we focus in a really narrow, strategic way?” The 
limited time horizon was one important reason why the Children and 
Youth Programme chose school discipline and health care as its main 
areas of focus. Both were issues that affected a large number of chil-
dren and that had a good chance of producing measurable successes in 
the time remaining.
Even perpetual foundations find it difficult to re-focus their strate-
gies significantly while a program is in mid-course — despite having 
the freedom to extend the timeline or to revisit the schedule in later 
years. In many foundations, the tendency when facing a program whose 
original design starts to look over-ambitious, or one that runs into 
greater-than-expected obstacles, is to wait, watch, and sometimes even 
double down. As consultant Gary Walker wrote to the James Irvine 
Foundation in 2007, “The forces, structure, and incentives of the phil-
anthropic world are geared toward staying the course — or expanding 
the course. The call for more time, resources, and technical assistance is 
not an unusual large-foundation response to an initiative’s early or mid-
course problems.”12 
At Atlantic, the immovable arithmetic of a declining endowment made 
that sort of temporizing much less attractive. As a result, once the 
Foundation reached the conclusion that the odds of success on its cur-
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rent path were too low, it changed course swiftly and dramatically. The 
experience of Elev8 seems to suggest that although a limited life may 
impose unique pressures on foundation staff and Trustees, and some-
times prod them toward above-average ambitions, it also hones their 
critical senses, and piques their resolve to make changes sooner rather 
than later. As one staff member put it, “If you’re driving toward a cliff, 
you are going to be much more conscious of how fast you’re going, 
and how much time you need to stop, and when you’ll need to turn the 
wheel, than if you’re just coasting along on a straightaway that runs on 
forever and ever in front of you.” 
B. BUILDING AN INFRASTRUCTURE — LITERAL AND 
FIGURATIVE — FOR POPULATION HEALTH IN VIET NAM
Chuck Feeney made the first Atlantic grant for Viet Nam in 1997, 
donating $100,000 to a then-tiny nongovernmental organization 
called the East Meets West Foundation. Mr. Feeney visited Viet Nam 
the following year and made further grants to East Meets West to 
renovate a library and build a burn unit and pediatric care centre at 
Da Nang Hospital. University libraries and dormitories, schools, and 
other health facilities followed, often with East Meets West handling 
frontline construction management and Mr. Feeney taking a direct 
role in decisions about design and equipment. Along the way, Mr. 
Feeney also invited Atlantic grantees from other countries, including 
the United States, Ireland, and Australia, to come to Viet Nam and 
establish training or advisory relationships with their counterparts 
there. Many of these kinds of relationships continue to the present. 
None of them grew out of any broad strategic vision, at least at first. 
Following a maxim generally attributed to Mr. Feeney — “One good 
project usually leads to another” — the program initially took shape in 
increments, as each successive grant turned up additional opportuni-
ties and new ideas for accomplishing more. 
Four years after the initial Da Nang Hospital grants, as Atlantic was 
designing new programs and strategies for its final two decades, the 
Board began to consider ideas for what was then called a Public Health 
Programme for Viet Nam. Several elements of the proposed plan 
closely tracked Mr. Feeney’s original model: support for major insti-
tutions, creation of buildings and campuses that would significantly 
advance the country’s public health capacity, brokering agreements 
with institutions from other countries to offer technical assistance 
and training, and securing commitments from the Viet Nam govern-
ment to sustain and expand on Atlantic’s accomplishments. But by this 
time, in 2002-2003, the Foundation’s Board and management were 
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particularly looking for ways to narrow and focus their grantmaking as 
they began the process of winding down the endowment. So the new 
plan for Viet Nam zeroed in on public health in particular. Although 
the Foundation’s work continued to include other objectives — uni-
versity libraries, hospital and medical school infrastructure, improved 
emergency services — its primary goal was to help build Viet Nam’s 
budding public health movement, starting with the Ha Noi School of 
Public Health, into a prestigious, advanced, and influential component 
of the nation’s health system. On a parallel track, the program sought 
to improve public health policy in areas like injury prevention, tobacco 
control, and HIV/AIDS, as well as the government’s support of pub-
lic health and primary care more broadly, so as to raise life expectancy 
for large populations. It was still not a fully fleshed-out strategy, but 
it established points of emphasis — strategic nuclei, in a sense, from 
which future work would build outward.
In later years, beginning with a full strategic plan adopted in 2004, 
other components were added and a few were dropped. Many of the 
new ones — including major new facilities for national institutions in 
pediatrics and epidemiology, pilot projects to improve primary and 
preventive care in Viet Nam’s provincial health system, and a special 
initiative in eye care — continued to follow the original Feeney model. 
These components included substantial support for new or improved 
facilities and equipment, in addition to skill- and capacity-building 
efforts for staff and management, plus commitments from the national 
Ministry of Health for ongoing support. Many included international 
arrangements for technical assistance or joint ventures. 
Over time, some lines of work came to an end, including the initia-
tives for university libraries and eye care, but only after leaving behind 
significant new capacity, including new or expanded institutions and 
facilities, of lasting importance in Viet Nam’s education and health 
systems. Other work created durable changes in Vietnamese law and 
society. For example, work on injury prevention ended with a defini-
tive success in 2007, when all motorcycle and motorbike drivers and 
passengers were required to wear helmets. The new law was the result 
of years of advocacy, policy development, and economic groundwork 
by an international coalition that included Atlantic and its grantees. 
Atlantic’s eight-year, $20 million effort involved support for research on 
the human and economic benefits of a universal-helmet law, mobiliza-
tion of leaders and citizens around the cause, and even support for the 
creation of an industry to manufacture lightweight, attractive helmets, 
something that had been unknown in Viet Nam until the mid-2000s. 
Here, too, capital projects were a critical factor: Chuck Feeney made 
the seminal grant to the Asia Injury Prevention Foundation for a fac-
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tory to manufacture safe, fashionable helmets that have since become an 
affordable status symbol. 
Atlantic’s top two objectives for population health in Viet Nam 
— support for major institutions and centers of excellence in pub-
lic health, and creating replicable models of provincial health care, 
including new or upgraded facilities, human resources, and equip-
ment — have survived two succeeding strategy updates and are largely 
unchanged to this day, at least in their fundamental approach. As a 
result of this sustained effort, Atlantic’s influence is visible up and 
down the hierarchy of public health and health care in Viet Nam. 
At the community level are scores of new or substantially upgraded 
commune health stations — local clinics that care for disadvantaged 
families, including the urban poor, underserved ethnic minorities, and 
residents of remote villages — that are intended as demonstration 
projects for nationwide replication. At the top of the system are the 
leading national and regional institutions in public health such as the 
Ha Noi School of Public Health, the National Hospital of Pediatrics, 
the National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, and public 
health faculties in three major medical schools. 
Connecting these top- and bottom-level approaches is a strategy aimed 
at the whole system of health care in Viet Nam. The approach focuses 
on major constraints or bottlenecks in the health-care continuum, 
where a lack of capacity in one area not only results in diminished care 
for patients, but places greater stress on other parts of the continuum. 
In Atlantic’s strategy, superior care at the commune health stations not 
only raises health outcomes for underserved people close to where they 
live, but it also reduces pressure on major regional hospitals by pre-
venting or treating basic illnesses at a more appropriate place and level. 
Likewise, an improved primary, preventive, and public health policy 
leads to fewer preventable illnesses, a healthier population, and some 
relief for Viet Nam’s crowded tertiary-care institutions. As a 2008 evalu-
ation report put it, “Atlantic does not just pick up the bits and pieces 
of work that fit the foundation’s mandate, as many do, but looks at the 
whole picture strategically. The package of strategic planning, infra-
structure, training, management, equipment, information systems, etc. 
is on the table. Add-ons continue to be made as staff learn what works 
and what is missing.”13
One of those recent add-ons (or, more accurately, an expansion of 
prior effort) has been an intensified focus on the sustainability of the 
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various institutions, initiatives, and demonstrations Atlantic has sup-
ported in the past decade or more. For example, the latest update to 
the Population Health Programme strategy, approved in 2009, asserts 
that “The issue of sustainability [for improvements to commune 
health stations] will also be addressed through discussions with the 
Viet Nam Government, which we will press not only for the required 
initial investments, but for the long-term operational costs of the sys-
tem. Given the considerable momentum of this initiative, convincing 
the government and international development agencies to scale up 
the model nationally is a realistic goal prior to Atlantic’s spend-down 
target date.”14 
This passage on sustainability is practically the only place in which the 
plan makes specific reference to Atlantic’s limited lifespan or gives any 
sense of an approaching end to the program. Unlike the early plans 
for Children and Youth, for example, with their detailed timelines and 
schedules of activity and their efforts to link multiple grantees in coor-
dinated webs of activity, initiatives in Population Health have tended to 
be modular and detachable, progressing project-by-project, institution-
by-institution, layer-by-layer. The timing of one project or initiative 
does not necessarily depend on that of another, and each contributes 
to the overall goal in its own way, on its own schedule. One province’s 
commune health stations can be improved even if the work in another is 
delayed; capacity and training in one national or regional institution can 
be a huge success even if that in another runs into trouble. Most lines 
of work could end altogether, as the eye-care and library initiatives have 
done, and still have made a significant enough change in their fields to 
be fairly deemed a legacy. 
The program’s goals are, of course, more ambitious than simply com-
pleting some number of successful projects. The various parts are 
intended to fit together, to amplify one another, to be replicated, and 
to move the national health system and its component parts bit by bit. 
As an evaluator put it, “Rather than providing narrowly targeted inputs 
that ignore other points in the system that impact those inputs, Atlantic 
has taken a systems approach.” But what is distinctive about the popu-
lation health work is that this systemic vision is just one higher-level 
criterion for success. The individual projects could stand on their own 
and still be important, valuable, and durable. “In some sense,” one pro-
gram staff member said, “we’ve never really needed to worry about [the 
Foundation’s limited life]. Every project could, in theory, be the last, 
and nothing would be wasted. Of course, in that case, we would end up 
achieving less than we hope for, and much less than we’re capable of. 
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Some of the things we’ve done up to now have been sort of low-hang-
ing fruit. Having done that, we can now take this model into areas that 
are more difficult, where the risks are higher, and establish it in harder-
to-reach areas, in ethnic minority communities, in areas that have been 
neglected. But every step along the way is its own achievement, and 
each new step makes it stronger and extends the social-justice implica-
tions farther.”
The ability to score successes in near-term increments is partly a side-
effect of a program built initially on high-impact capital projects. Each 
project, if strategically chosen and well executed, with sound provision 
for long-term maintenance and operation, is its own discrete step in a 
longer chain of reform. For example, referring to one commune health 
station in rural Khanh Hoa Province — now operating in a new build-
ing designed, built, and equipped with Atlantic support — a program 
staff member reflected on the longer-term prospects for this single proj-
ect: “This staff director at the commune health centre, once she had the 
nice building, now had more people coming in, and they’re delivering 
more service, and the services are better and getting better outcomes. 
So now she’s saying, ‘We need A, B, and C to meet this increased 
demand and maintain this level of quality,’ and she has been forceful 
about advocating that to the [provincial] directors. To me, that’s the 
change — not so much the building that we built, although it all started 
with that. But the change is empowering the staff to address the direc-
tor and say, ‘This is what we have in mind, and this is what we need to 
do for the health of the people.’ And that’s how progress will come.”
It is also somewhat easier to take a project-by-project approach to 
reforming whole systems when working with a strong centralized gov-
ernment. Although privatizing and diversifying very quickly, most of 
Viet Nam’s health care system is still centrally run by a national minis-
try with a cadre of powerful provincial directors. Health-system reform 
in Viet Nam is not like trying to improve after-school services or chil-
dren’s access to health care in the United States, where it is necessary 
to persuade multiple independent agencies and layers of government 
and a vast array of private and civic organizations to work together. A 
policy change by the Viet Nam government — if persuasively negoti-
ated and consistently adhered to — is all but sufficient by itself to bring 
about enormous changes in the way health care is provided nationwide. 
That is especially true when, as in Atlantic’s program, citizens’ groups 
and mid-level professionals are also equipped to advocate for further 
improvements and hold government to its commitments. 
A third factor that makes the Viet Nam environment different from that 
of other countries where Atlantic works is the economy’s strong rate of 
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growth. Even in the relative bust years of 2008-2010, Viet Nam’s real 
rate of GDP growth never fell below 5.5 percent — a rate that Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States could, in those years, only 
dream of. In this context, questions of sustainability may pose all of 
the usual political and planning challenges — building a constituency, 
cultivating leadership, formulating arguments, fueling a movement — 
but the underlying arithmetic of funding and sustaining social change 
is basically favorable. As a result, the government has been willing to 
discuss increased investments even beyond what Atlantic staffers ini-
tially predicted. “I never expected the government to be as cooperative 
as they have been recently,” one staff member said, “in terms of being 
willing to sit down and talk to us about co-funding and long-term 
issues. … I think part of it is that we’re helping the government achieve 
many of its own social goals. Rapid growth here has produced a lot of 
income inequality, and the government understands that under those 
conditions, stability in the country depends on delivering benefits for 
the lower rungs of the economic ladder. I think the government sees us 
as helping them figure out how to achieve that.” To be sure, each new 
demonstration project still has to be executed efficiently and then nur-
tured, evaluated, and promoted for replication. None of that is easier in 
Viet Nam (and some of it is harder) than elsewhere. But if all of that is 
persuasively done, the government can almost certainly afford to repli-
cate the success, and it seems increasingly motivated to do so. The same 
is not so true in other places.
As an exercise in time-limited philanthropy, the Population Health 
Programme in Viet Nam is similar in many ways to Atlantic’s earlier 
success promoting advanced research centers in Ireland (a program 
that likewise started with Mr. Feeney’s personal initiative). Ireland’s 
Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions, or PRTLI, like-
wise began with capital investments in major centers of excellence, and 
won long-term operating commitments from a national government 
enjoying the fruits of rapid economic growth. Atlantic’s investments 
made possible new and expanded work in these institutions, building up 
a sector that had previously been neglected and underdeveloped, and 
helping it to attract and train outstanding people who would further 
advance the cause. Each investment was, to an important extent, a dis-
crete and important contribution to Ireland’s economy and educational 
system, all by itself. But collectively, they helped raise advanced research 
to a national stature it had not previously enjoyed. Eventually, it was 
possible for Atlantic to withdraw from the field, because other public 
and private funding had grown enough to sustain the momentum. Even 
amid Ireland’s current economic retrenchment, where higher education 
and research will surely share the general fiscal pain, there is at least 
a vigorous debate about the economic value of preserving the PRTLI 
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legacy — a discussion that would have been much harder to imagine 
without Atlantic’s seminal investment.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO AN IMPENDING SUNSET
It is hardly remarkable that two programs as different as U.S. Children 
and Youth and Viet Nam’s Population Health would have adopted 
markedly different strategies and goals. The point of setting them side-
by-side is not to compare the two lines of grantmaking, but to see how 
their different constraints and opportunities led them to view the end 
results of their work, and to think about the way that work would con-
clude, in sharply contrasting ways. 
In a complex, crowded, and atomized field like children and youth 
in the United States, it proved difficult at first to find a niche where 
Atlantic could make a sizable contribution, achieve something tangible 
in fewer than 20 years, and then leave behind sustainable activity when 
it departs. The choices the program team initially made included 
complex and risky elements. In the original Elev8 initiative, they 
attempted to draw a large number of grantees into a well-integrated 
web of activity in a few demonstration sites. But in a fully engineered 
model of that kind, once Foundation leaders began to doubt the 
premises of the effort, small adjustments would not have made much 
of a difference in the cost, the duration, or the odds of success. At that 
point, program staff had to redesign Elev8 significantly; narrowing its 
focus, reducing the number of moving parts, and reorienting it toward 
goals that could either be achieved in the shrinking time remaining or 
could be built into a movement that would carry on beyond Atlantic’s 
life. With every passing year, their latitude to make meaningful 
changes diminished sharply.
The initial strategic choices were much less difficult in Viet Nam’s 
health care sector — as Mr. Feeney first discovered simply by touring 
the badly under-resourced facilities at Da Nang Hospital in the late 
1990s. There, the challenge was not in finding a productive area in 
which to make a mark or a constructive way to get started; there were 
many of those waiting to be pursued. Nor was it hard to find the right 
partner — first and foremost, it would have to be the government — to 
provide near-term leverage and long-term sustainability. (Other inter-
national donors were also working in Viet Nam, but not at a scale so 
large that they dominated any major field.) And ensuring tangible ben-
efits within 20 years would not require an exotic or complex strategy. 
It would have been significant if the Foundation simply had improved 
some facilities, secured commitments to maintain them, and helped 
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strengthen a handful of influential institutions. Beyond that, altering 
the broader health-care system, enlarging the field of public health, 
raising the standards of professional training, emboldening grassroots 
leadership, and other systemic goals became part of a steadily escalating 
vision. But those elements came later; they were not a starting point, 
but were additional and cumulative. In this kind of gradually expand-
ing strategy, where the complexity of the model increases only bit by 
bit, changes of direction on any given front or at any given moment are 
comparatively easy. If plans for one kind of facility turned out not to 
be feasible, or if another seemed more promising, project plans could 
be altered without veering from the underlying strategy. If one level 
of intervention proved more fertile than another, resources could be 
shifted its way without changing the essentials of the program. 
It would be too simple to conclude from these two examples that a 
foundation with a limited life is better off with programs whose strat-
egy is modular, incremental, and project-oriented rather than entirely 
designed in advance. Such choices depend most of all on an institution’s 
mission, the opportunities that present themselves, and the leaders’ 
confidence in the likely outcomes of their approach. But the compari-
son of these two experiences at least suggests that, when contemplating 
a limited life, a foundation is not necessarily best served by fully 
formed, long-term program plans that prescribe every major step, and 
depend on faithful and timely execution, from beginning to end. It does 
become necessary, at some point, to begin “imagining the end,” as Gara 
LaMarche put it in 2008, and making year-by-year plans for “leaving 
fields and countries” in an orderly way. That time is now approaching 
for Atlantic, as the country and program teams begin thinking about 
their last five years of grant commitments. But at least in the case of 
Elev8, attempting that kind of endgame planning ten or 15 years in 
advance arguably created an illusion of clarity rather than the real thing.
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3.
PERSONNEL
TENDING TO
HUMAN RESOURCES
In November 2010, Atlantic circulated to every employee an “H.R. 
Statement of Principles,” which the senior staff had been discussing and 
drafting for nearly six months. The statement set forth the Foundation’s 
values concerning its relationship with staff and its commitments to 
the people on its payroll. Among several sections touching on such 
fundamentals as Diversity and Equity; Respect and Transparency; 
Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion; and Compensation and 
Benefits (among other topics) was a section headed “Spend-Down.” 
A senior staff member described it as “the first official statement on 
Atlantic’s limited life from a Human Resources perspective, to the best 
of my knowledge.” Another said it “represented a kind of assurance 
that the organization recognizes the special demands that limited life 
requires of people — the hard work, the pressures, the short future here 
— and that Atlantic intends to reciprocate the loyalty that people bring 
to their jobs.”
The section is brief enough to quote in its entirety:
We will treat employees equitably and act transparently in all of our 
spend-down planning regardless of level, role or geography. That 
commitment includes 
•	 Carefully	considering	and	planning	for	the	impact	of	the	spend-
down on each staff member.
•	 Keeping	staff	fully	and	regularly	informed	of	the	planning	
process.
•	 Informing	affected	staff	as	soon	as	we	know	the	timing	of	the	
impact of spend-down on them so that we can partner with them 
in planning for their future.
•	 Treating	staff	fairly	and	equitably	in	relation	to	retention	strat-
egies, severance packages, notice periods and preparation for 
career post-Atlantic.
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The statement offered no specifics, but was “more about the psycho-
logical relationship” between the Foundation and its personnel, as 
one manager put it. Still, it established a tone of mutual loyalty and 
of concern about employees’ futures, and it committed the institution 
to an open and deliberative means of conducting personnel mat-
ters for its remaining years. The statement expressly set out to dispel 
one anxiety that several staff members had reported hearing (or had 
expressed) in water-cooler conversations: that the Foundation might 
be making confidential plans to retain or out-place a few high-ranking 
employees and leave others to fend for themselves. Key phrases in 
the statement, like “regardless of level,” “each staff member,” and 
“fairly and equitably,” addressed these concerns head-on, while also 
giving a more general assurance of even-handedness and transpar-
ency from both the Human Resources team and senior managers. The 
document also helped to counter some employees’ supposition that 
planning for the end stages of Human Resources policy must already 
be far advanced, even if undisclosed. In reality, as the statement clearly 
implied, “planning for the impact of the spend-down” had not yet 
progressed very far, and employees would be made fully aware of the 
planning process when and as it unfolded. 
Beyond that, the lack of specifics, one senior staff member pointed out, 
was all but unavoidable at this stage: “The truth is, while we have had 
conversations and maybe two or three meetings about [the H.R. impli-
cations of] Atlantic’s limited life, it has been at a very, well, I’d call it a 
generic level. I’d call it conversations, really, as opposed to any plan-
ning.” That would soon change, as Senior Vice-President Marcia Smith 
had made clear at the annual staff meeting. The Human Resources 
department, she said, would begin in 2011 to organize a process of cre-
ating “Individual Development Plans” for every Atlantic staff member. 
These would help employees to plan the next stage in their careers 
(or their retirement) and to pursue — possibly with help from the 
Foundation — the skills they would need to make the step.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
In offering to “partner with” employees “in planning for their future,” 
managers were aware of the danger of seeming to promise too much. 
“We are not a university,” one staff member said, “and we can’t give 
the impression that we’re going to be able to provide whatever educa-
tion or training everyone might need in order to do the next thing they 
want to do.” Consequently, the articulation of principles was followed 
by another policy statement specifically on “Training and Education.” 
It was an overall policy on the subject, not focused mainly on the end 
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of the Foundation. In fact, most of it set forth provisions on acquiring 
skills that are required for or related to a person’s job at Atlantic. But it 
made clear that resources for training and education are limited, that 
requests would call for more than one layer of review, and that train-
ing required for Atlantic-related work would take priority in a limited 
budget. Even so, the policy concluded with the promise of further 
provisions specifically related to the end of the Foundation’s life: “This 
policy sets out rules for the ordinary course of business. We expect 
staff development will increasingly be a key strategic tool as Atlantic 
approaches its finale. We will revise and amend it to suit organizational 
and staff needs as we move closer to spend-down.”15 
“That’s really the most we could say right now,” one of the drafters 
of the policy said around the time it was released. Preparation for 
the final years “is just now barely getting under way, and we will be 
saying something different in a year about that. This [policy state-
ment] is mainly relevant to my future in Atlantic. And then there is 
a different thing, which will be relevant to my future post-Atlantic. 
We haven’t made that distinction clearly [when discussing training 
policy] in the past, but it will be made now, going forward. What is 
most important is that people can rely on what we say about what we 
will do and spend on development for them.” A reliable statement on 
end-stage training, this staff member added, would have to come after 
the Foundation has a better sense of what the Individual Development 
Plans may call for, and what kinds of educational and training support 
would be needed and affordable.
PREPARING FOR ‘D-DAY’
To some extent, the Individual Development Plans would need to be 
informed partly by the personnel needs of the programs and country 
teams in Atlantic’s remaining years. But those needs won’t be defined 
until late 2011 at the earliest, when the country teams’ final five-year 
planning process is ended or at least far advanced. In the meantime, 
however, what one staffer called “generic” personnel development plan-
ning could begin right away, focusing on choices that every employee 
will eventually need to make, and the corresponding forms of support 
they might request, as their inevitable departure date nears — whenever 
that may be. 
“We can’t focus on the actual end date for anybody yet,” this staff 
member explained, “because we really can’t predict that right now. But 
what we can do is recognize that for every employee there will be a 
WINDING DOWN 
THE ATLANTIC
PHILANTHROPIES
2009–2010: BEGINNING
THE ENDGAME
PERSONNEL
43
day, call it D-day, when their particular time is up. We can then think 
about D-day minus three months: What do we have to have in place 
for [that employee] at that point? What do we need at D-day minus 
six months? We can go backwards from a notional date, and educate 
ourselves about what we ought to have ready, what [employees] should 
be able to expect, what they should be preparing to do on their own. 
And we need to start that planning with the person at 18 months 
before any possible D-day, or two years — I don’t know. Maybe in 
some cases we won’t know that far in advance. But those are the ques-
tions we can be asking now. Later, when the [country and program] 
plans are finished, we may have a clearer sense of when some of those 
D-days are going to happen, more or less. Human Resources isn’t in 
control of that. But we know we will have to be ready for it, and that’s 
where we have to start planning now.” 
Even apart from the uncertainties about timing, the challenge of writ-
ing Individual Development Plans for every employee on a staff of 
roughly 130 people in seven countries might appear overwhelming at 
first glance. But it’s possible, even likely, that employees’ needs and 
interests will cluster into some manageable number of general cat-
egories, within which plans may be relatively similar. For example, a 
number of staff members, especially in the United States, have well-
established careers in the foundation or nonprofit sector and may 
expect to continue on that already-established career path. Others 
have professional credentials (physicians, attorneys, accountants) or 
technical or administrative skills that could carry them in many pos-
sible directions with only minor help from the Foundation. Some 
intend to retire or to reduce their work schedules in the next several 
years. Admittedly, there are others — such as program staff in Ireland, 
for example — who will face a difficult employment economy with 
few opportunities to stay in philanthropy, and planning in those cases 
may take more effort. Yet even there, at least some of the variables will 
be similar from person to person, and many Irish staff members may 
want the same kinds of help. “We can actually begin grouping people’s 
needs and interests almost in a matrix,” one manager speculated, “in 
terms of where they are in their career and their thoughts about the 
future. I imagine there will be subsets, and particular kinds of thinking 
and planning we’ll have to do for groups of people — but it won’t be 
as intimidating as, ‘Oh, my God! We have to do 130 completely dif-
ferent development plans!’”
Overall, as 2010 came to a close, the only thing that seemed certain 
for Atlantic’s Human Resources staff was that the unit’s scope of work 
was about to change significantly in the coming year. Precisely what 
shape its new challenges would take, and how they would all be met, 
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were matters that would not become clear for several more months, at 
a minimum. But for the first time since the Board decided to bring the 
Foundation to a close, the practical implications of a limited life had 
officially, and probably permanently, taken a central place on the H.R. 
team’s routine agenda. 
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Amid a generally strong year in world markets, Atlantic’s total invest-
ment fund returned 9.1 percent in 2010. After expenditures of roughly 
$450 million, the endowment ended the year at $2.82 billion, a reduc-
tion of $211 million from the end of 2009. Both the investment returns 
and the expenditures were in line with the Foundation’s expectations.
Still, the effects of the 2008-09 recession had taken a toll on Atlantic’s 
grantmaking budget, even though its investment portfolio had suffered 
less than that of many other endowed institutions and had recov-
ered quickly. (It lost 15.8 percent in 2008, a year when the Standard 
and Poor’s 500 index declined by 37 percent; Atlantic’s investments 
rebounded with a 13.1 percent gain in 2009.) As a result of both the 
recession and higher-than-budgeted commitments in previous years, 
the Foundation had had to reduce its grants budget to $310 million 
in new commitments for 2010 and $290 million for each of 2011 and 
2012, from a pre-recession target of around $360 million annually. This 
reduction was actually somewhat less dramatic than it seems from the 
raw numbers; a portion of it was merely a side-effect of changes in the 
way disbursements were accounted for. In any event, by the end of the 
third quarter of 2010, executives were projecting that the budget could 
rise to a level of $325 million a year in 2013 and continue at that level 
for the remaining four years of active grantmaking.
Chief Investment Officer Philip Coates wrote to the Board’s Investment 
Committee in early 2011 that, “In terms of asset size, the situation 
continues to look manageable, assuming we can generate 5-10 percent 
returns per annum,” an assumption safely in line with past performance. 
He noted that the need to maintain liquidity would be “more challeng-
ing,” given the danger that a steady shrinkage of the endowment could 
leave a higher and higher percentage of less-liquid assets to be dealt 
with over time. Still, he reported, “decent progress was made on this in 
2010, and we expect strong liquidity in the coming two to three years.”
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MANAGING A SHRINKING 
ENDOWMENT
WINDING DOWN 
THE ATLANTIC
PHILANTHROPIES
2009–2010: BEGINNING
THE ENDGAME
CONCLUSION
46
For the past decade, Atlantic’s financial staff and the Board’s Investment 
Committee have been intently focused on drawing the institution to an 
orderly, well-managed conclusion. For them, the slowly approaching 
end of Atlantic has been a daily reality, a sort of ongoing countdown, 
that shapes most of their other concerns. On the program side of the 
Foundation, however, while there has been ample awareness of the 
impending sunset, and much discussion about how it might take shape, 
there has not been as much actual involvement in it. For most of the time 
since the Board decided to expend the full endowment and close the 
Foundation, Atlantic’s main preoccupation in its program management 
has been on strategy and quality, not on exiting. The long timeline for 
winding down — 15 years between the initial decision and the expected 
final commitment — made that choice possible, and arguably prefer-
able, for many years. But in 2010, the emphasis began to shift.
To be sure, every country and program team has for years devoted time 
and effort to thinking about grantees’ sustainability after Atlantic’s 
departure. They have sought to engage other funders who might be 
interested in carrying on some of the work. They have commissioned 
research and evaluations on nearly all the major lines of grantmaking 
to mine the lessons of Atlantic’s experience. All of those are essential 
parts of a responsible exit. But they are all common activities at per-
petual foundations as well. And most of them have taken place within 
the separate programs, not at an overarching institutional level. Even 
at lower levels, closer to the front lines, plans for the future have rarely 
confronted the Foundation’s terminal decisions head-on: how the final 
acts will take place, what the last grants will be for, which lines of work 
will be helped to continue and which will end, where Atlantic will focus 
its dwindling human and financial resources in the last years. 
It has simply been too soon to answer most of those questions, and 
perhaps it still is. The cautionary lesson of the early Elev8 planning, 
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in which long-range specificity collided with a number of unexpected 
developments, shows how risky it can be to try to manage distant events 
too precisely too far ahead of time. In 2005 and 2006, a Foundation-
wide task force attempted to draw an institutional road map leading 
all the way to the final stages of activity, but it disbanded after raising, 
but not resolving, a number of important questions and challenges.16 
Some members of the task force believed they could have accomplished 
more if they had soldiered on. But several others — as well as the 
Foundation’s top leadership at the time — concluded that the effort was 
unavoidably speculative at that stage, and therefore premature.
Similarly in Human Resources, planning for employees’ post-Atlan-
tic futures has gained little momentum until now, not least because 
employees themselves had not been especially exercised about it. As one 
employee succinctly put it, “If you had asked me three years ago what 
I would be doing today, anything I told you would have been totally 
wrong. So do I really want to have a big conversation now about what 
I’m going to be doing in 2014 or 2017 or whatever? Maybe I should, 
but I don’t really think it would mean much.” 
Judging purely from anecdotes and incidental conversations, that atti-
tude appears to be changing as this report is written. One reason could 
be that the end is drawing closer — although as the employee just 
quoted points out, it is still too far away for most people to feel any 
real pressure. In fact, when staff members do acknowledge thoughts 
about changing jobs, it is nearly always for the same reasons that such 
thoughts emerge in other work places: a desire for change, dissatisfac-
tion with current responsibilities, or a tempting opportunity opening up 
elsewhere. But there is another, more immediate reason why Atlantic 
employees will probably soon be thinking about their futures more than 
they have so far: The topic is going to come up more and more often in 
the Foundation’s routine business.
Beginning in 2011, country and program teams were taking the first 
steps toward plans that will govern the critical final round of commit-
ments from 2012 through 2016. In these plans, some lines of activity 
will no doubt be designated to wind down sooner than others, and with 
them, some corresponding jobs. It will be nearly impossible for staff to 
engage realistically in this kind of planning without being reminded of 
significant life changes ahead. At the same time, the Human Resources 
staff will start designing and rolling out its approach to Individual 
Development Plans — yet another reminder that big questions and 
changes are looming. Regular updates on end-stage planning from 
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senior management and the Board, such as the session at the staff’s 
2010 annual meeting, will likewise keep the topic alive and in the atmo-
sphere.
All of these developments, starting in 2011 and intensifying there-
after, will likely influence the tenor of discussions at every level: 
institutional, country, program, cross-program, and among the sup-
port functions. Approximate timetables will become increasingly firm; 
ranges of strategic options will narrow; exploratory lines of work will 
either show promise or be discontinued. As this report is written, what 
Mr. LaMarche once described as “imagining the end of Atlantic” is 
about to become less an act of imagination and more an exercise in 
forecasting, planning, allocating resources, and in relatively few years’ 
time, execution. 
